Designing and Managing Cross-Sector Collaboration: A Case Study in Reducing Traffic Congestion

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On behalf of the IBM Center for The Business of Government, I am pleased to present this report, *Designing and Managing Cross-Sector Collaboration: A Case Study in Reducing Traffic Congestion*, by John M. Bryson, Barbara C. Crosby, Melissa M. Stone, and Emily O. Saunoi-Sandgren of the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota. The report continues the IBM Center for The Business of Government's long-held interest in new approaches to collaboration. For over a decade, the IBM Center has published numerous reports on the role of collaboration within the public sector and between the public, private, and non-profit sectors.

Today, transportation congestion represents a serious threat to the national economy of the United States and affects virtually every aspect of our lives—where we live, where we work, where we shop, and how much we pay for goods and services. According to the Texas Transportation Institute, road congestion annually results in 3.7 billion hours of travel delay and 2.3 billion gallons of wasted fuel. Whether it is trucks stalled in traffic, cargo stuck at overwhelmed seaports, or airplanes circling over crowded airports, congestion costs Americans an estimated $200 billion a year, according to the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT).

In August 2007, five urban regions were selected by the USDOT to participate in a path-breaking federal transportation initiative. Known as the Urban Partnership program, the initiative funded a total of $1.1 billion in grants for integrated transit, highway pricing, technology, and telecommuting strategies aimed at reducing traffic congestion in major urban areas. The Minneapolis-St. Paul region was selected to receive one of the five grants. This report describes the history of that initiative, from collaboratively putting the proposal together in 2007, to grant award, to implementing the grant in 2008.

The Urban Partnership program involves complex collaborations among government agencies at local, county, regional, state and federal levels, and between governments and private partners. It has also involved an unconventional assembly of conventional technologies for transportation management.
held together by a shared vision of significant reduction in congestion. The Urban Partnership program led to new or expanded coalitions of cross-sector, cross-level interests backed by significant policy and public funding incentives.

This report focuses specifically on a cross-sector collaborative effort to significantly reduce traffic congestion in the Twin Cities metropolitan area of Minnesota. The organizers of the program concluded that a collaborative, multi-modal approach was crucial to making real headway on a longstanding, costly, nearly intractable public problem. Cross-sector collaboration is now increasingly both necessary and desirable as a strategy for addressing many of society’s most complex public challenges.

The authors describe the collaboration involved in obtaining and implementing the Minnesota Urban Partnership program. They offer insights about what contributes to successful collaboration and what hinders it. The report presents lessons learned for public leaders attempting to organize collaborations, including specific lessons for project sponsors and champions.

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Introduction: Understanding Cross-Sector Collaboration

Cross-sector collaboration is now increasingly both necessary and desirable as a strategy for addressing many of society’s most complex public challenges (Agranoff, 2007; Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine successfully addressing problems such as poverty reduction, economic development, early childhood education, the educational achievement gap, disaster relief, or HIV/AIDS reduction without cross-sector understanding, agreement, and collaboration.

This report focuses specifically on a cross-sector collaborative effort to significantly reduce traffic congestion in the Twin Cities metropolitan area of Minnesota. The effort was part of a federally initiated program called the Urban Partnership Agreement (UPA) designed to make use of tolling (congestion pricing), mass transit, technology, and telecommuting to reduce traffic congestion in metropolitan areas. The organizers of the program had concluded that a collaborative, multi-modal approach was crucial to making real headway on a longstanding, costly, nearly intractable public problem. They insisted on collaboration among government agencies, and across federal, state, and local jurisdictions. Nonprofit organizations and some businesses were also important partners at the state and local levels.

Collaboration occurs in the midrange of how organizations work on public problems (see Table 1) (Crosby & Bryson, 2005, pp. 17–18). At one end of the continuum are organizations that have little to do with each other when it comes to public problems that are beyond their individual reach. At the other end are organizations that have merged into a new entity meant to address the public problem through merged authority and capabilities. Other approaches include:

- Sharing information
- Undertaking coordinated activities
- Developing shared-power arrangements, such as collaborations, in order to pool their capabilities to address the problem or challenge

We define collaboration as the linking or sharing of information, resources, activities, and capabilities by organizations to achieve jointly an outcome that could not be achieved by the organizations separately (Bryson, Crosby & Stone, 2006, p. 44). Note that by this definition the power sharing in a collaboration does not imply equal power, nor does it necessarily imply much in the way of shared interests and goals. Indeed, in our experience collaboration typically involves uneven power and mixed motives.

Cross-sector collaboration occurs for many reasons. The first is simply that we live in a shared-power world in which many groups and organizations are involved in, affected by, or have some partial

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to acknowledge those who made this research possible. The study was funded by the Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) Institute, a program of the University of Minnesota’s Center for Transportation Studies (CTS). Financial support was provided by the United States Department of Transportation Research and Innovative Technologies Administration (RITA).
DESIGNING AND MANAGING CROSS-SECTOR COLLABORATION

Table 1: Collaboration in the Continuum of Organizational Sharing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What Is Shared</th>
<th>Mechanism for Sharing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Merger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities &amp; Resources</td>
<td>Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Crosby and Bryson (2005, p. 19)

responsibility to act on public challenges (Crosby & Bryson, 2005). Beyond that, in the United States, advocates of power sharing across sectors are often responding to a longstanding critique of the effectiveness of government when it acts on its own. Sometimes, the critique has been based on facts; at other times, it has been guided by principles favoring limited government or extolling the virtues of other sectors. The critique has resulted in waves of deregulation, privatization, budget caps and cuts, and the rise of “third-party government,” in which nongovernmental actors are enlisted to achieve public purposes (Salamon, 2002).

At the same time, cross-sector collaborations do not solve all of the problems they tackle. Indeed, some are solved badly, and some solutions have created the problems they were meant to solve.

Collaboration—especially cross-sector collaboration—is no panacea. This is partly because of the interconnectedness of things, such that changes anywhere reverberate unexpectedly and sometimes even dangerously throughout the system. Complex feedback effects abound. And issues previously thought about in fairly narrow terms, such as health care, are now being redefined as issues of economic competitiveness, industrial policy, education policy, tax and expenditure policy, immigration policy, and more. How to respond collaboratively and effectively to problems that are so interconnected and encompassing is a major challenge.

This report will describe the complex collaboration involved in obtaining and implementing the Minnesota UPA. We will offer insights about what has contributed to successful collaboration and what has hindered it. We present lessons learned for public leaders attempting to organize collaborations, including specific lessons for project sponsors and champions.

Key Factors in Successful Cross-Sector Collaboration

This report draws on our previous extensive research into cross-sector collaboration and our ongoing federally and University of Minnesota-funded research on the Minnesota UPA. The research involved a detailed literature review and set of propositions that guided the work (Bryson et al., 2006). We also carefully reviewed newspaper and other accounts of the effort. We conducted 26 interviews of key actors at federal, state, and local levels, and we used an advisory team to help guide the research, interpret the findings, and draw out implications for practice (Bryson, Crosby, Stone, & Mortensen, 2008).

Table 2 (p. 8) provides a list of the key factors for successful cross-sector collaborations around which this report’s insights and lessons learned are organized.

We have also found that collaboration is a way of creating institutional change. As relationships are developed among government agencies and between sectors, existing organizational structures, processes, and norms are changed, and new practices are adopted. In this context, collaborative work can become a catalyst for transcending existing institutional structures and approaches. Implementation of initiatives such as the UPA program thus offers a potential strategy for developing new institutional forms that may be more effective and responsive than existing structures. The UPA experience indicates that different parts of the transportation field that have not historically worked well together. It appears however, that these different parts of the field—highway engineering and transit, for example—are now developing more effective working relationships.

In the next section we present a brief history of the Minnesota UPA experience to date.
Table 2: Key Factors in Successful Cross-Sector Collaborations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Factor</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understanding Prior Initiatives and the Environment</td>
<td>Cross-sector collaborations are often formed in a somewhat turbulent environment and often follow sector failure. Getting collaborative efforts off the ground requires powerful sponsors, a variety of linking mechanisms, formal and informal networks, and general agreement on the problem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing Effective Processes, Structures, and Governance Mechanisms</td>
<td>The process dimensions of collaboration bring individuals and their social and political relationships into the mix, and the flow of their action shapes and is shaped by structural arrangements. Governance involves both formal and informal mechanisms and influences the effectiveness of collaboration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding the Roles of Key Actors</td>
<td>The main locus of power will shift over the course of a collaboration process, often following a funding source.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrating Leadership and Key Competencies</td>
<td>Cross-boundary and multi-level leadership is important to forging successful cross-sector collaborations; so is extensive visionary and political leadership by numerous formal and informal leaders. Crucial to the success of a collaboration are competencies, or the abilities, technologies, or processes that help a collaboration perform well against important goals or critical success factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating an Outcome-Oriented Accountability System</td>
<td>A collaboration’s success depends, in part, on having an accountability system that tracks inputs, processes, and outcomes; using a variety of methods for gathering, interpreting, and using data; and using a system that relies on strong relationships with key political and professional constituencies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In August 2007, five urban regions in the U.S. were selected to participate in a path-breaking federal transportation initiative. Known as the Urban Partnership program, the initiative funded a total of $1.1 billion in five regions for integrated transit, highway pricing, technology, and telecommuting strategies aimed at reducing traffic congestion in major urban areas. The initiative involves complex collaborations among government agencies at local, county, regional, state and federal levels and between governments and private partners. It also involves an unconventional assembly of conventional technologies for transportation management held together by a shared vision of significant reduction in congestion. The Urban Partnership program led to new or expanded coalitions of cross-sector, cross-level interests backed by significant policy and public funding incentives.

**Development of the Urban Partnership Program**

In the 1960s, economists started applying their analytic tools to the traffic congestion problem that was beginning to plague major U.S. urban centers. They viewed the highway system as a classic public good that was being over-consumed in particular locations or at particular times because the roads were seemingly “free” to individual drivers. The economists reasoned that by dynamically pricing clogged highways—where the price depended on the level of congestion—public officials might reduce or better manage demand and even raise more revenue for transportation. The economists argued that some drivers would pay the fee, but others would either take alternative, uncongested routes, vary their driving time, take the bus, or stay home (see What is Congestion Pricing?). By the 1990s, policy entrepreneurs were imagining integrated transportation systems that relied on congestion pricing, transit, a variety of advanced technologies, and telecommuting.

Unfortunately, from the 1960s through the 1990s, the idea of using pricing to manage traffic congestion had difficulty gaining traction. Feasibility stud-

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**What is Congestion Pricing?**

Congestion pricing—sometimes called value pricing—is a system of charging users of roads during peak traffic times in order to reduce traffic congestion. By charging users during these times, it shifts discretionary rush-hour travel to other transportation modes (i.e., bus, light rail) or to off-peak periods. Taking these cars off the road during these peak traffic times, congestion pricing enables greater, more efficient traffic flow, and allows more cars to move through the same physical space. There is a consensus among economists that congestion pricing represents the single most viable and sustainable approach to reducing traffic congestion.

One form of congestion pricing utilized in the Minneapolis-St. Paul UPA project includes variably priced lanes, called HOT lanes. “HOT” is the acronym for “High Occupancy Toll.” On HOT lanes, low occupancy vehicles (i.e., a single person in a car) are charged a toll, while High Occupancy Vehicles (HOVs), public transit buses, and emergency vehicles are allowed to use the lanes free of charge or at reduced rates. Innovative advances in technology allow for dynamic pricing of the toll lanes. In other words, the tolling fee adjusts up or down depending on the amount of traffic using the HOT lanes.

**Source:** Federal Highway Administration, Congestion Pricing Primer
ies and a few pilot projects were tried, but elected officials and citizens generally weren’t convinced that the approach would work. Citizens also objected to paying a fee for facilities they felt they had already funded through their taxes. By the late 1990s, however, congestion was getting even worse in many urban areas and a greater number of public officials were realizing they couldn’t build their way out of the problem.

Within the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) during the George W. Bush administration, Tyler Duvall, assistant secretary for transportation policy, began working with a few other top transportation officials to move from researching congestion pricing to mounting larger-scale demonstrations. One of his key allies was Mary Peters, the then-administrator of the Federal Highway Administration, but there were also a number of others in the department, including Patrick DeCorla-Souza, a career civil servant who was a long time advocate of congestion pricing. Duvall tried to convince then-USDOT Secretary Norm Mineta to make congestion pricing a federal priority. Initially Mineta was skeptical, but after a top-level strategy meeting in 2006, he agreed to make the shift, and congestion pricing was included in the department’s 2006 Strategy Statement.

Duvall, Peters, and others then began designing a demonstration project to channel funding to major metropolitan areas that would tackle congestion with a set of complementary strategies called the “Four Ts”: transit, technology, tolling, and telecommuting (see Table 3). The designers thought that integrating the four strategies would provide the biggest payoff in terms of reducing congestion, but the project emphasis was on specifically demonstrating whether congestion pricing had a clear positive impact. Project sponsors were able to secure about $120 million in departmental discretionary funds to put into what became known as the Urban Partnership project.

Soon, however, a much larger amount of money became available when Congress suspended its usual practice of allowing members to earmark transportation funds. As a result, the pot for the UPA eventually grew to a total of $1.1 billion. In

### Table 3: Congestion Reduction Strategies (The “Four T’s”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>How Used in the Urban Partnership Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>Technology eliminates the need for toll collection booths, putting the charging mechanism into individual vehicles. Technology allows for real-time commuter information displayed electronically on the road and at transit stations. Buses are equipped with GPS tracking.</td>
<td>• Adding cameras, dynamic signs, communications, and signal priority for transit (September 2009) &lt;br&gt; • Technology installed on buses for guidance on narrow shoulder lanes (September 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolling (Congestion Pricing)</td>
<td>Conversion and construction of shoulder lanes and other existing highway lanes into dynamically priced lanes.</td>
<td>• Conversion of left shoulder lane to MnPASS lane during periods of congestion (September 2009) &lt;br&gt; • Construct north- and southbound MnPASS lanes (October 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transit</td>
<td>Construction of bus rapid transit routes with Park and Ride facilities. Transit fare incentives during high congestion.</td>
<td>• Additional bus lanes and improved transit stops in downtown Minneapolis (December 2009) &lt;br&gt; • 6 new suburban Park and Ride facilities (September 2009) &lt;br&gt; • 3 new suburban transit stations (September 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommuting</td>
<td>Businesses adopt results-oriented programs allowing employees to work from home, decreasing the amount of commuters on the road.</td>
<td>• Results Only Work Environment (ROWE) Program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
addition, Mary Peters became U.S. Secretary of Transportation after the resignation of Secretary Mineta, allowing her to sponsor and champion the program from the top position in the department.

**Minnesota’s Proposal Process**

Meanwhile, in Minnesota, congestion pricing advocates, state and local officials, and transit supporters began discussing participation in the Urban Partnership program, officially announced at the end of 2006. Minnesota, after all, was the site of one of the country’s most successful congestion-pricing experiments, in the form of the MnPASS project on I-394—an Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) application of dynamic pricing to a segment of I-394 in the western part of the Twin Cities metropolitan region (see *MnPASS*).

Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT) officials decided, after some initial reluctance, to submit a proposal for an Urban Partnership grant in collaboration with the Metropolitan Council (Met Council), the regional government which operates the bus transit system for the Twin Cities region. Soon after, the Citizens League, a nonprofit public policy group focusing on the Twin Cities, and the University of Minnesota’s Center for Transportation Studies and the Humphrey Institute’s State and Local Policy Program featured the Urban Partnership program at their Road Pricing Summit on February 1, 2007. Tyler Duvall spoke at the summit, and MnDOT announced that the department would seek a UPA grant. Table 4 presents the timeline for the initiative.

Table 5 (p. 12) lists key stakeholders, including several involved in the I-394 project, that participated in developing Minnesota’s UPA application. The timeline they worked on was very tight for transportation projects of this magnitude.

MnDOT project leaders assembled an interagency Steering Committee to oversee the proposal development process. In addition to individuals from

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Key Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase I: Pre-Award Development Period</td>
<td>December 2006</td>
<td>Federal government announces UPA funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MnDOT announces MN’s UPA proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February 1, 2007</td>
<td>UPA Steering Committee organizes stakeholder workshops, chooses project corridor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March 2007</td>
<td>MN submits UPA proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April 2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase II: Post-Award Legislative Period</td>
<td>August 2007</td>
<td>I-35W bridge collapse diverts media attention, reduces project controversy; UPA finalists announced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Winter 2008</td>
<td>Speculation mounts over Governor Pawlenty’s position as vice-presidential candidate for Sen. John McCain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spring 2008</td>
<td>State legislature approves $55 million in state matching funds; passes legislation to change HOV lane to HOT lane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase III: Project Implementation Period</td>
<td>September 2007</td>
<td>Formation of project operational and technical teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September 2007–June 2008</td>
<td>Stakeholder meetings continue as information exchanges only</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*MnPASS*

MnPASS is the Minnesota Department of Transportation’s electronic toll collection system. MnPASS toll collection is entirely automated and works through a small electronic transponder attached to individual vehicles. The toll is automatically deducted from a pre-paid MnPASS account by toll recording equipment located on the road. Fees vary in amount by the level of traffic congestion in the MnPASS lanes.

MnPASS was first implemented in 2005 in the I-394 corridor in the west metropolitan area of Minneapolis. Its successful operation led to implementation of MnPASS Express Lanes for the UPA project on the I-35W corridor south of Minneapolis, which will open in October 2009.
MnDOT and the Met Council, the committee over time grew to include local officials from highly congested traffic corridors, county officials, and University of Minnesota experts. MnDOT hired SRF Consulting Group (SRF) to prepare the actual grant proposal. SRF played a key role in helping organize the process and draft the proposal. Figure 1 (p. 13) is the organization chart SRF created for proposal development. The lack of detail in the chart underscores the fluidity within which the proposal process engaged key stakeholders.

Since the proposal was due at the end of April 2007, the steering committee members knew that they had to obtain agreement among numerous state and local parties about the main components of the proposal. For example:

- In which locations would congestion pricing be applied?
- What form would it take?
- What would be the implications for bus service and routing?
- What technological innovations would be emphasized?
- What role would telecommuting play?

The committee organized a half-day workshop in March 2007, and several subsequent meetings to help numerous stakeholders consider possible answers to these questions and develop a consensus about what should be included in the proposal. Additionally, project supporters worked behind the scenes to make sure that powerful legislators, the governor, and the lieutenant governor (who was also commissioner of transportation) would support the form of tolling required for the UPA proposal.

At times, project advocates worried that disagreements about proposal components would sink the effort, but eventually the steering committee and outside advocates obtained enough consensus and compromise to be able to submit a strong proposal, focusing on the I-35W corridor and its connections with downtown Minneapolis. A major reason for selecting the I-35W corridor was that local government interests, represented by the I-35W Solutions Alliance, were strongly aligned.

Table 5: Key Organizational Stakeholders in Minnesota’s UPA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization/Agency</th>
<th>Role in UPA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT), including the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and the Federal Transit Authority (FTA)</td>
<td>Initiated UPA program and selected grant recipients; awarded $133.3 million in funding to Minnesota; primary funders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT)</td>
<td>Primary partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Council, Metro Transit</td>
<td>Primary partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor’s Office</td>
<td>Support for proposal and state matching funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MN State Legislature</td>
<td>Approved $55.2 million state match to federal money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anoka, Dakota, Hennepin, and Ramsey Counties</td>
<td>Important potential implementers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Minneapolis</td>
<td>Important secondary partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Minnesota: Center for Transportation Studies, ITS Institute, and the State and Local Policy Program</td>
<td>Research; neutral conveners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-35W Solutions Alliance</td>
<td>Organized local government officials along I-35W corridor and pushed for I-35W to be UPA’s focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens League</td>
<td>Neutral conveners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transit for Livable Communities</td>
<td>Involved local community group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota Valley Transit Authority</td>
<td>Involved suburban transit agency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Alliance, were the best organized and prepared to move ahead. Minnesota’s proposal was selected as one of the nine semifinalists announced by USDOT in June 2007. The semifinalists then were invited to present their plans to USDOT, and in August, 2007 the nine were winnowed to five finalists—the Twin Cities, Seattle, New York, San Francisco and Miami. (In the spring of 2008 New York would drop out and Los Angeles and Chicago would be added; shortly thereafter, Chicago would drop out and be replaced by Atlanta.)

The total UPA grant to Minnesota was $133.3 million to be matched with $55.2 million in funds from the state legislature and Met Council (for a total funding of $188.5 million). In addition to approving the match, state legislators would have to approve tolling authority for the I-35W corridor. The UPA partners had approximately one year to complete assembling all components of the implementation plan.

Once Minnesota was chosen as a finalist, the UPA Steering Committee went into implementation mode. It became a smaller, more operations-oriented group and MnDOT put Nick Thompson, operations manager, in charge of day-to-day oversight of the operational aspects of the project. At the same time, the Met Council transit officials and local government partners began working on their pieces of the project, while legislators and MnDOT senior officials worked on legislative strategy.

Strategy development for gaining legislative approval and funding was far less participative than was the process for proposal development. Senior officials at MnDOT made most of the decisions regarding legislative strategy. Implementation processes and structures also differed considerably from the proposal development phase. The steering committee and operational teams were used to coordinate the work among existing organizations, but the power sharing was less significant than during the proposal development phases. Implementation duties were parceled out to relevant organizations that bore the responsibility for fulfilling them while coordinating activities with other actors.

Figure 1: UPA Proposal Development Organization Chart
Key Factors in Successful Cross-Sector Collaboration

The perceived need to collaborate across sectors has provoked two general responses. On one hand, organizational participants in effective cross-sector collaborations often have to fail into collaboration. In other words, organizations will only collaborate when they cannot get what they want without collaborating (Bryson & Crosby, 2008; Hudson, Hardy, Henwood & Wistow, 1999). The second response is to assume that collaboration is typically always best and one should start by searching for collaboration partners. Often, governments and foundations insist that funding recipients collaborate, even if they have little evidence that it will work (Barringer and Harrison 2000; Ostrower 2005). This case study actually embodies both responses: The USDOT mandated collaboration, but state and local actors across sectors had already concluded they could not significantly reduce traffic congestion acting on their own. Top-down mandates and bottom-up willingness to collaborate complemented and reinforced one another.

This case study also confirms that collaboration on the scale of the Minnesota UPA is a very complex assembly of human (individuals and relationships) and non-human (technologies, artifacts, laws and procedures) elements (Latour, 2005). As has been amply documented in the literature, collaboration is not an easy answer to hard problems but a hard answer to hard problems.

The difficulty of crafting an effective collaboration arises because of the complicated array of factors that need to be in place for a collaboration to succeed (Bryson et al., 2006). For example, this collaboration was facilitated by:

- Powerful sponsors and champions
- A variety of competencies
- An alignment of policy ideas, favorable politics, and general agreement on the nature of a significant problem to be addressed (Kingdon, 1995)
- Strong incentives

In short, the Minnesota UPA represented a successful-enough “alignment of the stars” to undertake the UPA initiative.

The insights to be gleaned from the Minnesota UPA experience fall into the five key factors presented in Table 2 (see page 8):

- Understanding prior initiatives and the environment
- Developing effective processes, structures and governance mechanisms
- Understanding the roles of key actors
- Demonstrating leadership and key competencies
- Creating an outcome oriented accountability system.

Linkages among these factors are also crucial. Leadership and competencies are particularly important in this regard, but so also are technology, vertical and horizontal relationships, rules and routines, and organizational ambidexterity.
Understanding Prior Initiatives and the Environment

Like many cross-sector collaborations, the Minnesota UPA formed in a somewhat turbulent environment; sector failure preceded it; and the UPA effort at the outset had to rely on powerful sponsors, a variety of linking mechanisms, formal and informal networks, and general agreement on the problem. Note that in what follows, all quotes are from interviews conducted as part of the research on which this report is based.

Environmental Turbulence and Prior Sector Failure.

In environments that are both complex and dynamic, organizations typically develop relationships with other organizations to decrease uncertainty and increase stability through promoting exchanges of needed resources, including information, technology, and funding (Emery and Trist, 1965; Powell, 1990; Thompson, 1967). In the case of the UPA, the turbulence in the environment concerned rapidly escalating, seemingly intractable traffic congestion in the Twin Cities metro area. Over time, a broad array of constituencies had become alarmed by this public problem, developed a shared sense of urgency for innovative solutions, and were forming alliances. For example, at the state level, transportation cleavages among rural, suburban, and urban constituencies were dissipating. Suburban constituencies (especially in first ring suburbs) were becoming more supportive of transit, thereby making support for something like the UPA more palatable to a Republican governor and transportation commissioner.

In 2006, citizens passed a constitutional amendment to provide dedicated funding for roads, bridges, and transit, indicating a growing consensus that all modes were necessary to create needed transportation infrastructure. Business groups were key backers of the amendment, indicating a growing understanding among them of diverse transportation issues and their impact on the business community, as well as increased support for major changes.

Organizations and groups seem more likely to engage in cross-sector collaboration when single-sector efforts to solve a public problem have failed (Bryson & Crosby, 2008). In the UPA case, there was also growing recognition that many previous attempts to solve this problem had failed. Several interviewees noted that legislators and government bureaucrats alike were willing to consider use of a market-based tool (pricing) as a mechanism for combating congestion because all the usual methods (e.g., road construction and regulation of access) had failed.

Environmental Forces. Collaborations are fostered and delimited by environmental forces external to the group itself (Sharfman, Gray & Yan 1991). Table 6 (p. 16) presents a summary of major environmental forces in the UPA environment.

In the case of Minnesota’s Urban Partnership Agreement, several positive factors came from the federal level. Most obvious was the USDOT’s creation of the generously funded Urban Partnership initiative. USDOT also insisted that congestion pricing, transit, technology, and telecommuting had to be included in the UPA package, thereby necessitating collaboration among various groups and agencies. Federal analysts also emerged as powerful champions of pricing—using an “economics frame” rather than an “engineering frame.” The Democratic ascendance in Congress led to a rethinking of earmarking and ultimately gave USDOT authority for allocating a large sum of money that would previously have been earmarked.

Additionally, USDOT champions—including Mary Peters, who had become secretary of transportation and thus was a champion turned sponsor—wanted to move quickly to launch the project before the end of the Bush administration in January 2009. The result was that powerful USDOT champions and a sponsor were able to develop a very generously funded program that was heavily focused on pricing and transit and forced local applicants to put together and implement proposals in a very short timeframe.

A positive factor, however, can also have constraining aspects (Sharfman, Gray, & Yan 1991) and that is also true with the UPA. The institutional arrangements that make the USDOT a powerful player (especially because of its funding role) in state and local transportation policies also constrain the activities that transportation agencies can do on their own or collectively. For example, normally Minnesota did not have access to the kind of money the federal government was putting on the table, and without
the federal mandate and funding, it would have been quite difficult to develop as integrated a transportation solution as the UPA agreement represented.

Another key factor was the collapse of the I-35W bridge across the Mississippi in Minneapolis. This occurred just before Minnesota was named a finalist for a UPA in August of 2007. One interviewee said the I-35W disaster may have helped reduce controversy about UPA simply because it diverted media attention from the project, and may have made federal officials more ready to send money to Minnesota. It is also possible that the effect was to focus citizens’ and policymakers’ attention on transportation generally, and specifically on neglected maintenance of roads and bridges. Another effect may have been to increase enthusiasm for a federal project that sent significant new money for transportation, even if it wasn’t about improving bridge safety.

Within Minnesota the power of USDOT and its regional offices is complemented (and partially offset) by other major power centers; these include MnDOT, the commissioner of transportation, the Metropolitan Council, and the governor. In MnDOT, the commissioner is quite powerful compared to similar positions in other state DOTs. The governor is an especially powerful player; he not only appoints the transportation commissioner and the members of the Met Council, but also determines their level of power. The Met Council experiences less concentrated power because its primary transportation policy-shaping group, the Transportation Advisory Board, includes individuals from MnDOT and local governments in addition to members of the council. This allotment of power is unusual; one interviewee called the concentration of power in the governor’s office, MnDOT and the Metropolitan Council “unbelievable,” in comparison with other states.

Other players that hold some level of power are the Minnesota state legislature (and the chairs of transportation committees), the Minnesota roads lobby, transportation policy advocacy groups (such as the I-35W Solutions Alliance and Transit for Livable Communities), and transportation researchers and analysts, especially at the University of Minnesota.

One cannot underestimate the importance of the MnPASS project on I-394 as a driver of the UPA collaboration. Through the previous MnPASS process,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive Factors</th>
<th>Federal Level</th>
<th>State Level</th>
<th>Regional/Local Level</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USDOT creates and funds UPA program. Program design necessitates multi-party collaboration</td>
<td>MnDOT is powerful institutional player, and has national reputation as a transportation innovator</td>
<td>Met Council is powerful institutional player</td>
<td>Key battles already fought and settled through successful MnPASS Project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champions of congestion pricing</td>
<td>Powerful DOT commissioner becomes supportive</td>
<td>Presence of knowledgeable and credible conveners and researchers</td>
<td>Availability of proven technology</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Powerful governor becomes supportive</td>
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<td></td>
<td>I-35W bridge collapse reduced project controversy</td>
<td>Twin Cities viewed as “smart” region nationally in Intelligent Transportation Systems</td>
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<tr>
<th>Constraining Factors</th>
<th>Federal Level</th>
<th>State Level</th>
<th>Regional/Local Level</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power of USDOT as authorizing and funding entity constrains state local autonomy and their activities</td>
<td>MnDOT initially reluctant to pursue UPA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Short time frame for proposal submission</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Governor, MnDOT commissioner, and legislature at times resistant</td>
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Table 6: Environmental Forces
many key battles around congestion pricing had already been fought and settled and forums for including a broad range of stakeholder voices were established. For example, MnPASS-related convening activities built support among local officials through a so-called “grass tops” approach and educated I-394 users about congestion pricing and its benefits. Workshops, focus groups and other forums helped get across the idea that adding “free” traffic lanes to deal with congestion only attracted more commuters and ultimately resulted in the same or worse levels of congestion.

Academic advocates at the Humphrey Institute and Intelligent Transportation Systems Institute at the University of Minnesota helped organize these activities. Technology was also a positive factor: as a solution, motivator, and facilitator. For example, technological advances make dynamic pricing possible as a solution to traffic congestion and allow motorists to use transponders rather than toll booths to pay. It also helps improve transit services, because it allows buses to travel with shorter headways and more predictable schedules.

Technology was also a motivator because it brought people to the table who were attracted by the possibility of being innovators. As one interviewee said, “It’s exciting to implement new technology.” Communications technology, though less visible, was also important as a facilitator of collaboration. For example, one interviewee noted that without email and the ability to include attachments, the proposal could not possibly have been done on time. Technology therefore also acted as a facilitator of the collaboration. In all of this, technological capability was ahead of policy and the UPA project brought technology and policy together. Technology, in other words, was not the bottleneck; politics and policy were.

The previous success of MnPASS, along with MnDOT’s national reputation for implementing advanced technologies for freeway management and for improving safety convinced federal officials that Minnesota was a good candidate for UPA. Our interviewees indicated that this confidence in MnDOT’s capacity overrode USDOT’s expectation that the UPA projects would include pricing of existing lanes, rather than turning shoulders into lanes and then pricing them. In turn, the ability of Minnesota’s UPA proposal to avoid pricing existing lanes made it easier for the governor to support the proposal.

Despite these significant positive forces of the UPA collaboration, there were several strong constraining forces. MnDOT’s top leadership and the governor were skeptical about congestion pricing and the UPA grant application. The legislature threatened to submit its own UPA proposal, and some legislators disliked the idea of targeting such a large amount ($55 million) in state funds to one corridor.

Another major constraining force included the UPA requirements themselves that meant only states that “had their acts together” were well-situated to apply for the program—UPA put a premium on previous success with tolling, transit, and smart technology.

**Direct Antecedents: Initial Agreement on Problem, Conveners, and Pre-existing Networks.** General agreement on the problem to be solved is an essential antecedent condition for collaborations (Gray, 1989; Waddock, 1986). Interviewees unanimously cited traffic congestion as the problem the UPA was designed to solve. Despite general agreement, however, interviewees presented multiple ways of framing the problem to which the UPA was a solution, including, for example, safety and health concerns, lost economic opportunity, commuter frustration, and taxpayer resistance to paying higher gas taxes or toll. The differences in problem framing could have been significant detractors to the UPA collaboration; however, the broadness of the problem definition and the influence of sponsors, conveners, and pre-existing relationships helped build a large and strong coalition.

Powerful sponsors and neutral respected conveners can provide legitimacy for a collaboration and bring potential partners together (Bryson et al., 2008). In this case, the endorsement of top transportation officials gave the Urban Partnership project legitimacy. MnDOT’s hesitance about applying for an Urban Partnership grant was overcome by internal champions as well as pressure from outside pricing and transit advocates like the Citizens League and legislators. Furthermore, respected groups like the University of Minnesota’s Center for Transportation Studies and the State and Local Policy Program at the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs had brought many of the participants together in forums and research projects in the past.
Designing and Managing Cross-Sector Collaboration

Pre-existing networks among organizations are an important predictor of whether they will come together effectively to form a collaboration. Several of our interviewees cited existing working relationships as a key reason the Minnesota’s UPA application process was successful. One interviewee noted, “Ten years ago you couldn’t have done [the UPA]; there are established ways of working together now.”

What is important to highlight with the UPA collaboration is that these prior relationships existed vertically, down through levels of government, and horizontally across public and private entities. At the federal level, the formation of an urban congestion working group growing out of an off-site meeting was instrumental in developing the Urban Partnership initiative. In turn, federal transportation officials knew and respected advocates and government officials in Minnesota. MnDOT and Met Council had previously formed Team Transit to coordinate transit-related projects. MnDOT, Metrotransit and the regional Federal Highway Administration office had all worked with many local partners on other projects previously. The University’s Center for Transportation Studies and the State and Local Policy Program had similarly been involved in research and convening activities with all of these stakeholders. Nevertheless, as one interviewee noted, while the UPA partners had worked together in the past, they had never worked together “all at the same time, never in this way.”

The context within which the Minnesota UPA process began was generally favorable to the effort, although there was no guarantee it would succeed. There was a broad sense that traffic congestion was a serious problem and a realization that previous attempts to solve it had failed, or at least that more of the same wouldn’t work. There was also a willingness to consider a market-based tool, dynamic pricing, rather than more traditional methods, such as construction or regulation.

The driving forces leading toward the local UPA effort outweighed the constraining forces. USDOT created a well-funded program that required multi-party collaboration. There were strong sponsors and champions at all levels willing to push the effort. The technology-related solutions appeared to work. And many key battles over congestion pricing had already been fought and won as a result of the I-394 MnPASS Project. Some important constraining forces actually helped the effort. USDOT’s requirements, including the short time frame, channeled and focused efforts. And while MnDOT, the commissioner, and governor at first were lukewarm to the project, they later got on board.

Developing Effective Processes, Structures, and Governance Mechanisms

The UPA process involved a variety of initial agreements, and the way those agreements were formulated had an effect on the outcome of the process. The process also depended on leadership of many kinds, including having powerful sponsors and champions. Success of the process also depended on its legitimacy in the eyes of key stakeholders, the creation and maintenance of trust, and effective conflict management and planning. But focusing on
cross-sector collaborations among multiple organizations also demands attention to how people and processes interact with structures (Parkhe, Wasserman & Ralston, 2006). Process dimensions bring diverse individuals and their social and political relationships into the mix and the flow of action shapes and is shaped by structural arrangements. Significantly, structure changed over time. Governance involved both formal and informal mechanisms and influenced the effectiveness of UPA. We came to see collaboration and hierarchy as both occurring in the shadow of the other; each played a strong role.

We examine processes and structures used within the UPA within three somewhat overlapping phases:

**Phase I: Pre-Award Development Period** from the UPA program announcement in December 2006 through the proposal submission in mid-April 2007.

**Phase II: Post Award Legislative Period** that began before the end of the first phase and ran until May 2008. This was the phase that focused on securing state matching funds and needed legislation to move forward with UPA.

**Phase III: Project Implementation Period** from September 2007 through June 2008. This latter phase encompassed initial UPA implementation work.

Within each phase, one can see how elements of process and structure display both network characteristics and more bureaucratic hierarchy, but the emphasis varies between phases. Large networks of stakeholders at the beginning of the process used forums and existing relationships to gain initial agreements and craft the proposal. Following the award and moving into the legislative strategy and implementation stages, more hierarchical structures, such as a Steering Committee and clearly designated subunits, were in place to move the project along.

**Phase I. Pre-Award Development Period**

This phase began with MnDOT’s decision to apply for a UPA grant in December 2006 and concluded with the submission of the application in April 2007. The phase was characterized by fluid and participatory decision-making processes within an emerging governance structure, the UPA Steering Committee. For many, this phase was exciting and innovative in the ways in which leadership and decision-making took place both within and outside of normal hierarchical channels.

**Forging the Initial Agreement to Proceed.** While agreement existed that traffic congestion in urban areas was a significant public problem that had to be addressed, there was not initial agreement on whether and how the metro area would respond to the Urban Partnership Agreement opportunity. Controversy over the grant’s required pricing component and its potential to substantially shift existing transportation and transit plans both needed to be addressed early in the UPA grant development process.

MnDOT was opposed to pricing existing highway capacity, an important component for USDOT, but was more comfortable pricing added capacity. Knowing this, a nonprofit policy group, the Citizens League, that had published an earlier report advocating the use of pricing, was helping a legislative group introduce its own UPA proposal. The Citizens League/legislative proposal was taken off the table when MnDOT decided to apply. Still at issue, however, was whether a MnDOT proposal would be innovative and bold enough to win the federal dollars. As one non-MnDOT advocate stated, “We were actually moving faster than MnDOT and we had to tell MnDOT, ‘let’s go ahead and do it.’ We ended up having to push MnDOT.”

Another issue that affected the initial agreement concerned the extent to which UPA, with its very short timeframe, would disrupt existing transportation and transit plans. Both MnDOT and the Met Council (a critical primary partner for the transit portion of the proposal) must carefully develop regional plans for priority projects in consultation with their constituencies, including community groups and local political leaders. For the Met Council, it was essential that elements of the UPA be directly related to the Council’s regional plan and not require massive plan alterations. In order to gain Met Council approval, those working on the UPA proposal had to work with its existing plan and amendment processes. According to one MnDOT interviewee, “We went to the Met Council and asked for permission to put [the UPA contents] in the plan. At first we got resistance—they said ‘you are going to shift the region’s priorities.’ We decided...”
to split it up into different amendment processes and took the transit first, worked that through the system. [This] allowed us to get better data....”

Proposal Development Processes and Structures.
After agreeing to move forward with a UPA proposal, many realized that the UPA project was "much bigger than MnDOT," in the words of one interviewee. The consultant hired by MnDOT to manage the grant process first assembled an interagency Steering Committee and charged it with exploring options, gathering feedback, and making major decisions about components of the Minneapolis application. These decisions were significant and included how to use the pricing component, which metro corridor to target for pricing, the overall role of transit in the project, and how to develop a wide base of support among affected state leaders and local communities for a successful UPA application.

During this phase, the Steering Committee chose to maintain loose, not tight membership boundaries. Thus, the composition of the Steering Committee expanded as time went on, adding local officials from metro-area cities and counties, representatives from the university, and so forth. The inclusive arrangement built trust. One interviewee from MnDOT thought that the fluid design of the Steering Committee was one of the most effective decisions the UPA partnership made:

… we needed to be very inclusive in putting this partnership together. From early on, we had meetings that included folks from a real broad sector, including a variety of folks from different departments within MnDOT, folks representing Metro Transit and the Met Council.... just being inclusive and hearing what everybody had to say was, I think, effective.... It was not politically driven, it was from a practical sense. If we can present ourselves and say this is how we think it should be done, then we can take it to the commissioners and give it to a champion for the cause.

The processes used by the Steering Committee for proposal development included educating a broad range of stakeholders about critical elements of the proposal and drawing these stakeholders directly into project governance activities. Words like “champion,” “coalition,” “teams,” and “partners” dominate the organizational chart for UPA during this stage.

Early on, the Steering Committee decided to hold “stakeholder workshops,” a model used successfully in the I-394-MnPASS project. The first of these took place at a 2007 Road Pricing Summit organized by the Citizens League, a nonprofit, citizen-led public policy think tank, and held at the University of Minnesota, a neutral convening location. The timing was fortuitous as educating stakeholders about UPA became the focus at the summit, and a high level USDOT official—Tyler Duvall—delivered the keynote address. A second meeting was held in March with over 60 stakeholders and focused on which corridor would be targeted for tolling. Selecting a corridor could have been contentious and competitive. However, the design of the meeting highlighted neutral convening and facilitation and multi-agency collaboration: the event took place at the University of Minnesota with its Center for Transportation Studies in a leadership role, and both the lieutenant governor (and then-commissioner of transportation) and the chair of the Met Council signed the invitation. It was through this process and subsequent discussions that the I-35W corridor from downtown Minneapolis south to Lakeville was chosen. In selecting a corridor, one interviewee noted:

The role of the I-35W Solutions Alliance in the process and the selection of the corridor was critical. The Alliance is a joint-powers organization made up of elected city and county officials along the I-35W corridor from downtown Minneapolis to Lakeville in the south. In the words of a member, the Alliance is “a forum to hash out ideas, come to an agreement on issues. We don’t have any power to force anybody to do anything. It is our ability to persuade.” As frequent participants in the monthly meetings, MnDOT had established working relationships with the Alliance.

While not a political advocacy group, the I-35W Solutions Alliance nonetheless played useful political roles for the UPA project. First, it gave the UPA the local political support and legitimacy necessary to justify selection of the targeted corridor. Second, and crucial to gaining support from the governor,
the corridor in question already had a High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lane that could be transformed into a High Occupancy Tolling (HOT) lane; therefore, no existing lane would be “taken away” to comply with the tolling requirement. This was especially important to MnDOT and to the governor who strongly opposed taking away any existing highway lanes. For the corridors advocated by other groups, UPA would have to take away an existing lane, something the governor would not support.

**Summary of Phase I Process and Structure.** What is notable about the structures and processes used for the proposal development is how fluid they were in contrast to more typical decision-making in bureaucratic hierarchies. The Steering Committee membership included not just leaders from the two primary partners but coalitions such as the I-35W Solutions Alliance and others, including the Citizens League, the Center for Transportation Studies, the Humphrey Institute’s State and Local Policy Program, and elected officials from metro cities and counties.

The outside members played significant convening, facilitation, and leadership roles throughout Phase I and used their political capital to gain bi-partisan support for the proposal. In addition, usual methods of careful project planning, budgeting, and coordination were often set aside, although the crafters of the UPA application sought where possible to include projects already on the drawing boards.

The proposal drafters also included as many projects as they could that fit the “Four T” categories, hoping that by doing so they could improve the chances of having a winning proposal. Several interviewees stated that the tight timeline mandated by the USDOT and the direct role played by the Secretary’s office made possible, and even required, going around normal channels and various organizational, functional, and budgetary boundaries.

**Phase II—Post-Award Legislative Period**

In the words of one UPA participant, the proposal development phase (Phase I) was characterized by “let’s get all the ideas out there.” In contrast, the process for crafting the strategy to gain legislative approval for matching funds required for UPA was far less fluid and participatory (Phase II). Here, several interviewees concurred that decisions about legislative strategy were made at the top of MnDOT and took place largely outside of the UPA decision-making structures. For one thing, typically state public administrators cannot testify at the legislature without authorization from the top.

Once funded, the UPA partners and stakeholders had to deal deftly with the political environment. Three aspects of this environment are important. First, just prior to the UPA award announcement in August 2007, the I-35W bridge over the Mississippi River in Minneapolis collapsed. The I-35W bridge disaster may have helped reduce controversy about UPA simply because it diverted media attention from the project, and may have made federal officials more ready to send money to Minnesota. On the other hand, the main effect may have been to focus citizens’ and policymakers’ attention on transportation generally, and specifically on neglected infrastructure. Attempts to assign blame for the collapse increased tensions between the Republican administration and the Democratically controlled state legislature. The collapse placed the governor in the spotlight and not all of that was positive.

Second, the bridge collapse and the attention focused on the governor occurred as speculation mounted about Governor Pawlenty’s potential selection as vice president on John McCain’s presidential ticket. Speculation about Pawlenty’s being a leading candidate to be selected by McCain gained momentum as McCain emerged as the Republican front-runner during the early months of 2008.

Third, and most proximate to the UPA project, the state legislature had to approve $55 million in state matching funds and pass legislation that allowed the HOV lane and shoulders in the I-35W corridor to be turned into a dynamically priced lanes. Despite the attraction of $133 million in federal funds, legislative approval for these key aspects of UPA was far from assured. Some legislators did not necessarily oppose shoulder pricing or other policy aspects of the UPA, but disliked the idea of targeting $55 million in state funds to one corridor. According to one state senator deeply involved in transportation policy, legislators could go along with this project if they were assured that their areas would have priority for future transportation funding. Building on deep divisions over who was responsible for the bridge collapse, a key area of contention between the legislature and the governor and lieutenant
governor (who was, at the time, also the commissioner of transportation) was transportation policy, funding, and future direction.

**Phase III—Project Implementation Period**
The processes and structures for UPAs implementation also differed significantly in the post-award phase; both were much more formal and hierarchical. A UPA organizational chart was developed with a Leadership Team at the top composed of the heads of MnDOT, the Met Council, the regional office of the FHWA, and a ‘project champion,” who was Bob Winter, a high-level MnDOT official.

Beneath the Leadership Team is the Steering Committee, which according to several interviewees, became more formalized in membership and duties. It is composed of top level managers from MnDOT, the Met Council, the Center for Transportation Studies at the University, and representatives from the FHWA, the City of Minneapolis, the four affected counties, and the Minnesota Valley Transit Authority. Beneath the Steering Committee is the program coordinator, MnDOT’s Nick Thompson, who was also the project manager for the I-394 MnPASS project, and under his supervision are department-like groupings for highway, tolling, and transit infrastructure, telecommuting, public relations, and so forth. As one key partner stated,

...I think we have a good process set up—we have a Steering Committee with all the partners and then there’s a communications/outreach committee that just got going. Then there are the implementation teams. If you start to look at the structure, there’s really a lot of people involved.

When you are flying by the seat of your pants to put together an application and get it approved and then you win it, you take a step back and say, ‘Who do we really want to assign this to for the next two years?’ This is a humongous undertaking. I don’t think people realize how huge this is.

The operational or technical teams within each of the department-like units were crucial for successful implementation and include people like county engineers and public works directors. As one middle manager put it, “[Coordination] has to start at the top and, to deliver something that’s really, truly coordinated, it needs to make it down to the technical level where you have champions.”

The stakeholder meetings, so important to the proposal development phase, continued after the award, but changed in tone and substance in the eyes of some. Several interviewees noted that these meetings

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**Figure 2: UPA Project Implementation Organization Chart**

![UPA Project Implementation Organization Chart](image-url)
had become more of an information exchange between the key stakeholders and MnDOT. In the words of one interviewee, “MnDOT does not want a lot of feedback [at this point in the process].” There was some divergence of opinion concerning whether the Steering Committee as an oversight body was driving UPA or whether, in fact, MnDOT was making most major implementation decisions.

**Understanding the Roles of Key Actors**

While we discussed power relationships under the first factor, understanding prior initiatives and the environment, we return to the roles of key actors here because of the way these relationships evolved as UPA developed. Power, particularly at the level of overall design, was initially located at the federal level—both the FHWA and the FTA were involved in developing the project, but FHWA was the stronger
actor, led by then administrator Mary Peters: “She has her fingers all over this project.” More broadly, several interviewees felt that the real leadership during the early stages of UPA came from those within these federal agencies and not state transportation officials.

The locus of power in this case then shifted to the collaboration itself as the proposal was crafted. For example, interviewees usually cited MnDOT and Metro Transit as the primary partners in designing and implementing the UPA project. However, the role of secondary partners, such as the I-35W Solutions Alliance, the Humphrey Institute’s State and Local Policy Program, and Citizens League, was often mentioned as a key reason why the project got off the ground in the first place. As one interviewee explained, “Basically, the SLPP and the Citizens League did the heavy lifting, going to all the cities … asking them to submit a proposal.” Minneapolis officials were also mentioned frequently as very important partners. Having been convinced that transit—a big priority for Minneapolis—was indeed a major component of UPA, Minneapolis became a strong (and needed) advocate for UPA. Counties, such as Hennepin and Dakota, and other local cities along the I-35W corridor were important secondary partners who played key roles.

Once MnDOT decided to submit a UPA proposal, and the I-35W corridor was chosen as the location for the project, the number of partners involved shrank considerably. MnDOT handled much, though clearly not all, of the legislative strategy in Phase II.

Phase III partners representing community organizations or local government were not excluded entirely from the implementation process, as they still attended the quarterly UPA workshops, but some participants felt that the workshops were becoming less and less about gaining community input, and more and more about MnDOT running the show. One interviewee echoed the sentiments of several when he/she said, “I don’t even think of it as a multi-agency partnership. I just think of it as MnDOT.” That view may be a bit extreme, but certainly during the implementation phase, power appears to reside among implementation teams comprised of operating staff within relevant public agencies.

Collaboration overall in the UPA process probably more closely fits the model of a more top-down mandated collaboration, rather than a more bottom-up community empowerment (Himmelman, 1996). But that generalization masks the differences between the two phases of the effort. Phase I focused on system-level planning and involved a substantial measure of power sharing among the participants, in part because there was simply no way to put together a successful proposal without the contributions and buy-in of a large number of players beyond MnDOT and the Met Council. Phase I thus might be termed “collaboration in the shadow of hierarchy” (S. E. Page, unpublished peer review comments to authors, May 23, 2008). In contrast, Phase II more closely resembled coordination among a few major hierarchies, with consultation along the way with other stakeholders. This phase might be termed “hierarchy in the shadow of collaboration.”

Said differently, since Phase I of the UPA involved system-level planning, there was extensive negotiation among diverse stakeholders in which clearly power and politics played a role. As things moved toward implementation, MnDOT and transit officials were negotiating with fewer partners. There clearly was not equality in power sharing, but there were mechanisms and resources built in to deal in a reasonable way with power imbalances and unexpected shocks.

An important political concern arose when project proponents and implementers started to get ahead of the Minnesota Legislature and high-level people within the governor’s administration. Some legislators and other politicians who played important roles leading up to the grant proposal felt left out. In the end, the legislature and administration provided what was needed, but that was not a foregone conclusion. Said differently, it is important to coordinate with key political leaders so that necessary elected-official support is available when needed. Even as legislative politics were settled, the technical staffers were toiling over the implementation details on a mainly separate parallel track.

A particularly important aspect of the process was the effort key actors put into framing the UPA in such a way that support was increased and opposition was decreased. Getting people to accept a market-based solution and to see it as capacity building
Insights: Understanding the Roles of Key Actors

In examining the role of key actors in the UPA process, the following insights emerged:

- The main locus of power will shift over the course of a collaboration process. For federally initiated projects, the involved federal agencies will be the initial focal point. Once other partners are brought in and receive funding, the locus of power will shift to them, with power being more broadly shared during the project planning phase, and more narrowly circumscribed during the project implementation phase.

- If state legislative or other elected-body approval is needed, it is important to coordinate with key political leaders so that necessary elected-official support is available when needed.

- Issue framing is a crucial political task. The way issues are framed will determine much of the politics that ensue, as well as the way actors assess costs and benefits of proposals and construct winning arguments.

- Substantial monetary incentives obviously are helpful in inducing large systems involving multiple actors to move in desired directions.

- No major system changes are likely to occur absent a window of opportunity.

was a major political achievement. Strong monetary incentives clearly helped, but the framing mattered, too, as it helped make an unusual policy solution more palatable politically. Practitioners clearly would be well advised to attend to what is known about issue framing and put that knowledge to use when developing cross-sector collaborations (Crosby & Bryson, 2005).

Another key aspect of the process that also involves politics was the opening of a window of opportunity (Kingdon, 1995). Had earmarking in Congress not been curtailed for a year, the UPA program would have been very small at about $120 million for the whole nation. The window got a whole lot bigger when USDOT was able to put $1.1 billion on the table. The tight timelines dictated how long the window would be open, but also heavily favored those, such as Minnesota, who were close to ready to go. Practitioners should spend time discussing what kinds of windows of opportunity they need and how they might create them, to the extent that is possible, and be ready for them whenever they do occur.

Demonstrating Leadership and Key Competencies

Different processes, structures, and configurations of power have evolved as UPA has evolved, and all played a part in its success. But scholars have also highlighted the importance of cross-boundary and multi-level leadership in forging successful cross-sector collaborations (Huxham & Vangen, 2005), as well as the importance of extensive visionary and political leadership by numerous formal and informal leaders (Crosby & Bryson, 2005). Effective visionary and political leadership were definitely crucial factors affecting the success of the Minnesota UPA grant application and implementation. In addition, leadership-related competencies have also been crucial to fostering UPA’s success. Following Bryson, Ackermann and Eden (2007, p. 704), we define competencies as a subset of resources that connote “abilities, technologies, or processes that help an organization [or collaboration] perform well against important goals or critical success factors.”

Two main types of policy entrepreneurs—sponsors and champions—are usually required for successful complex change efforts:

- **Sponsors** have formal authority that they can bring to bear in securing political support and other resources for the effort.

- **Champions**, who often lack formal authority, supply ideas, energy, and determination to help stakeholders define public problems, evaluate alternative solutions, and push for the most promising solutions. The most effective champions have considerable facilitation skills but also are able to articulate and frame the policy idea in comprehensible ways to multiple constituencies. In the UPA case, several champions were essentially “monomaniacs with a vision,” true believers in a policy change effort, who persistently convened meetings and used other forums to communicate the importance of the change effort and the policy ideas that inspired it.

An especially important aspect of policy entrepreneurship at the very top of USDOT was tying
together the funding sources for different modes of transportation together to fund UPA. The view at the top was that traffic congestion was the country’s single biggest transportation problem, that “funding silos (including via earmarking) had done damage to the transportation network,” and that it was therefore important to link the modes. Competency in joining the funding sources together provided a vehicle for more integrated, effective solutions, and also introduced cost-benefit analysis “at the highest levels of the program,” which might facilitate more rational decision making. Interestingly, even though there is evidence from our interviews of support from the White House for the UPA program, we did not pick up any real evidence of national politics being a driving force.

Also critical was the fact that policy entrepreneurs existed at multiple levels, particularly at the federal and local levels. These policy entrepreneurs made the structures and processes work and helped nudge a reluctant MnDOT along during the early discussions. Absent these entrepreneurs, it is unlikely the collaborative could have been assembled; indeed, success in creating any cross-sector collaboration would appear to depend on effective policy entrepreneurship. The sheer number of actors implies that stakeholder analysis should be a standard part of designing and organizing collaboration efforts; otherwise, it is hard to see how the differing interests and mixed-motives of the many actors might be accommodated, if not actually reconciled (Bryson, 2004).

A particularly important leadership role was played by neutral conveners. Interviewees consistently described the significant neutral convening role played by the Citizens League, the university’s Center for Transportation Studies and the Humphrey Institute’s State and Local Policy Program. (Note that when we say neutral, we mean neutrality regarding specific details of the proposal, not neutrality about the virtue of congestion pricing.) In practical terms, this means that advocates of cross-sector collaboration should carefully attend to the possible need for neutral conveners, who they might be, and what skills and attributes they will need to have.

Helping people see pricing as different from tolling took competency in issue framing, as well as competency in persuasion. Getting people to see congestion pricing as building capacity, rather than as taking it away, is a major rhetorical move with major political consequences (Kingdon, 1995). The struggle over language involved MnDOT, where many didn’t see the difference between adding tolling (which involves the same prices regardless of congestion, and was also seen as “taking something away”) and dynamic pricing (where the “toll” varies based on congestion and throughput, or vehicles moved per unit time, is increased). Pricing advocates nationally and regionally see linking pricing to capacity building as crucial for building broad public support for the idea and expanding its use.

Champions need a high tolerance for risk and situational ambiguity. To the extent they are championing untried, unpopular, and truly innovative ideas, they may experience years in the policy wilderness. They risk being associated with “crazy ideas,” identified with a “lost cause,” and/or considered “policy nags.” Champions in this case included Patrick DeCorlal-Souza, Tyler Duvall, Lee Munnich, Adeel Lari, Bob Deboer, and other less visible people. DeCorlal-Souza had pushed the idea of road pricing at internal USDOT forums and external forums around the country for years. Munnich studied “value-pricing” as an antidote for traffic congestion and became a determined champion who helped convince state legislators to approve the MnPASS program, and along with Ken Buckeye of MnDOT developed and circulated highly readable reports on the outcome of MnPASS implementation. Sometimes champions began as skeptics—for example, Duvall. Leaders have to be convinced they will have followers. Fighting for a policy innovation will almost by definition begin on the margins of acceptability. Leaders want evidence that the battle won’t be hopeless, that a defensible plan can be crafted.

Sponsors are people with formal authority and are more likely to provide political leadership. USDOT Secretary Mary Peters, Governor Tim Pawlenty, Lt. Governor Carol Molnau, State Senator Steve Murphy, and Met Council Chair Peter Bell were all sponsors to a greater or lesser extent. Champions often take on the task of winning over sponsors. For example, Duvall helped win over Peters, and Munnich, DeBoer, and Lari attempted to win over Pawlenty, Molnau, and Bell. The champions in these cases were often walking a delicate line as they occasionally went around positional leaders to get to the sponsors; in doing so the champions ran the
risk of alienating both the people they went around and the sponsors.

Getting the UPA grant in the first place was a direct result of the political leadership competency of building coalitions. Interviewees noted that various groups had a history of working together, including the MnPASS coalition and the local governments along the I-35W southern corridor. Actors outside of MnDOT were crucial, including the Citizens League and the Humphrey Institute; their competency in gaining outside and public support was critical. Some interviewees said the corridor coalition did a good job of bringing legislators along, but others argued that the coalition got too far out ahead of legislators, which put legislative funding at risk.

Once the Steering Committee was assembled, it provided collective leadership as a convener of stakeholder workshops, in which a variety of constituencies were helped to develop a shared understanding of the implications of a potential Urban Partnership Agreement and to help it take tangible shape. The committee also connected these forums to key political arenas by inviting elected officials, lobbyists, and implementers whose support would be essential for implementing UPA. John Doan and SRF played an important role in designing and managing this consultation process. Once Minnesota’s UPA application was approved and Nick Thompson became the Steering Committee’s coordinator, he played a strong organizational leadership role in ensuring that various parts of the project were developing well and were synchronized with each other, and in securing needed amendments to the Metropolitan Council’s regional plan.

Building a coalition and securing the grant is one thing, but having a competency for actual collaboration is another—since collaboration involves more thorough and long lasting communication, cooperation, coordination, and highly consultative if not actually shared decision making (Margerum, 2002; Huxham & Vangen, 2005). Some interviewees argued that the project was funded because “whatever we [the collaboration] said they [USDOT] know we can deliver.” Others, however, argued that, “I don’t think we collaborate very well; basically the agencies make the decisions and just move ahead.”

Where collaboration has developed among stakeholders it has been a time-consuming and meeting-intensive process. As one interviewee said, “We had to learn to work together.”

More technical competencies complemented the leadership and collaboration competencies. Getting the grant depended on competency in grant writing and the organization that goes into it. The university and consultants had this competency. The transportation field has a clear competency in doing research. Research on congestion pricing has been going on for years and clearly demonstrated pricing’s effectiveness in reducing congestion. This research has resulted in a technical (or perhaps technological) competency embedded in the UPA design. As one interviewee said, “The proposal is based on science that works.” In a related vein, an interviewee argued, “I always saw technology as the glue that allows you to do the other stuff.”

MnPASS demonstrated the workability of the concept, as did previous congestion-pricing successes in London and Stockholm. One interviewee said, “The technology thing is not such a big deal because of I-394; it’s similar to what they already have in place, so its just ramping that up and being able to do more prominent things like real-time signage; that’ll be really cool.” It is clear, then, that technology did not hold back the UPA project. Looking back, an interviewee said, “I can’t think of any instance where [technology held us back] or where we wanted to do something but couldn’t because the technology wasn’t where it needed to be.”

Also present in the coalition is a technical competency in knowing how the transportation field works. Referring to the Steering Committee one interviewee noted, “We also have our members—the board is made up mostly of council members, commissioners, city managers and public works people. The people who know how this stuff [transportation funding, budgets, programs, all the details] works.” USDOT offered its own expertise to bolster local competency: A federal official said, “We were explicit that we would make available to our urban partners the abundance of human capital that resides in the department on issues related to technology, ITS, transit, road pricing. Yes, the urban partners get the special service.”

One final competency is important to emphasize, and that is that markets have to make rational
resource allocations. Congestion pricing is premised on the technology of market rationality. In other words, the “science that works” that was mentioned as part of technical or technological competency is partly the science that demonstrates that markets work. The second Bush administration and the Republican Party are certainly advocates of market-based solutions to public problems in general, and perhaps in that sense national politics played a role; but plenty of Democrats also favor the use of markets, so the administration and Republicans hardly have a monopoly on market-based policy solutions.

Creating an Outcome-Oriented Accountability System
It certainly appears that the Minnesota UPA will create public value by building on individual organizations’ self-interests and characteristic strengths, while minimizing or overcoming their characteristic weaknesses. The Minnesota UPA’s ultimate success will depend in part on its having an accountability system that tracks inputs, processes, and outcomes; uses a variety of methods for gathering, interpreting, and using data; and uses a system that relies on strong relationships with key political and professional constituencies.

Accountability can be particularly tricky in collaborations, as the multiplicity of actors and agencies involved often causes ambiguity around the question of “who is responsible for what?” (Bryson et al., 2006). In the UPA collaboration, interviewees were nearly unanimous in identifying MnDOT as the agency ultimately accountable for the success of the project. A few interviewees also mentioned the Met Council; these are the only two agencies that were signatories to the UPA, so their accountability is legally mandated.
It was also noted that those elements of the project requiring significant knowledge or expertise are also aspects of the project for which knowledgeable actors should be held accountable. These elements include the design of the project, the political process, and implementation (including juggling multiple timelines, requirements, and authorities at multiple levels of government).

Interviewees differed on how much UPA required new or different accountability processes. Particularly among those tied to the state government, some indicated that there are few, if any, additional accountabilities related to the UPA project. Instead, implementers are utilizing existing accountability processes to evaluate UPA: “We’re just implementing the funding and doing all our accountability processes as we always have.” Others within government felt that the diffuse nature of the project meant that no one was ultimately accountable, except perhaps the governor: “It is a problem because there is not a single sole responsible party that you can finger point at. People want accountability. The public wants someone to be responsible. There is not a single identifiable individual at the top. I think this will be a wonderful success and people will not have to worry about that. Bottom line: the governor is responsible for the state.”

Additional aspects of accountability include responsibility to the public for safety and enforcement of road management and behavior. Additionally, public officials noted UPA is an important vehicle that allows them to be accountable to their constituents and responsive to their needs. Finally, several interviewees noted the role of the state and federal governments as the funders of the project: “The collaboration will be accountable to the state legislature and also the federal DOT. Because it’s about the money. Ultimately they’re accountable to the public to deliver the product.”

Part of accountability is evaluation, as collaborations must seek tangible ways to demonstrate their success. Evaluation of the UPA project will occur on several levels. First, it will be important to measure levels of traffic reduction and bus ridership, as these are essential aspects of the overall project goals. There are also built-in accountability systems at each level of government; for example, MnDOT enforces standard accountability practices, while the federal government requires a formal evaluation process focused on project management as well as outcome-based assessment.

In addition to these kinds of evaluation metrics, a more general and essential outcome of cross-sector collaborations should be the creation of “public value” (Moore, 1995; Bryson et al., 2006). In the

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**Insights: Creating an Outcome-oriented Accountability System**

The following insights emerged regarding creating an outcome-oriented accountability system:

- Accountability depends on having a system in place that:
  - Tracks inputs, processes, and outcomes
  - Uses a variety of data gathering, interpreting, and usage methods
  - Relies on strong relationships with key political and professional stakeholders

- Legal accountability is one thing—in the case of the Minnesota UPA, MnDOT and the Met Council are legally accountable. But there are many other kinds of accountability, including accountability for the various parts of the project that require significant expertise, and more general accountability to the public at large. People are likely to have many different views about who is accountable for what in a complex cross-sector collaboration.

- Evaluation is important and a variety of measures will be needed to demonstrate and clarify what the outcomes are. The public value created by UPA will be important to determine.

- It will also be important to determine first-, second- and third-order effects. First-order effects are the direct results of the collaboration process; in the UPA case, this means particularly a funded proposal. Second-order effects occur when the collaboration is well underway, for example, the new working relationships, construction projects, and outcomes immediately following the completion of all projects. Third-order effects may not be observable for some time, changes such as extensions of congestion pricing to other major Twin Cities transportation corridors.

- Practitioners obviously should pay attention to the role the media may or should play in the cross-sector collaboration in terms of building support, providing useful criticism, and helping assure accountability.
case of UPA, the public value clearly lies in the increased efficiency of a variety of transportation modes. As stated by one interviewee, “I think we’ll want to, and we should be able to, demonstrate increased transit use, demonstrate decreased congestion, demonstrate increased traffic volumes served through much of the corridor, demonstrate increased telecommuting.”

Aside from the most direct outcomes, collaborations may also instigate first-, second-, and third-order positive effects (Innes & Booher, 1999). First-order effects are immediately discernible as a direct result of the collaboration process. Second-order effects are likely to occur when collaboration is well under way, while third-order effects may not be evident until some time later. In the UPA partnership, interviewees noted several first-order effects, including the successful development of the UPA proposal and the initial collaboration. Expected second-order effects included further strengthening of working relationships among agencies, especially concerning implementation of specific UPA projects, and the demonstration of a pricing system that works.

Interviewees also speculated that a number of third-order effects could eventually come from the collaboration, such as the formation of future collaborative efforts in Minnesota and, by educating the broader public, the development of greater acceptance of pricing as a policy solution along with other innovative transportation strategies. According to one interviewee, “Every time we can show how pricing helps manage demand, we’re pushing a little bit more towards a broader policy, a little less fear of this tolling notion. Everybody has this tolling aversion in this country unless you can see the benefits.”
Lessons Learned

Based on research conducted for this case study, the following lessons emerged from our analysis of the Minnesota UPA project and our examination of the lessons learned from the project. The lessons are organized around the key factors presented throughout this paper.

Understanding Prior Initiatives and the Environment

**Lesson One:** When initiating a program that involves massive multi-level, multi-sector collaboration, the program sponsors and champions in the federal government clearly should NOT underestimate the requirements for stakeholder involvement built in large part on existing relationships.

It is hard to conceive how the Minnesota project could have succeeded without mostly pre-existing working relationships, but collaboration across federal program and funding lines was also an important determinant of success. This implies that federal-level sponsors and champions of cross-level and cross-sector collaboration at the state and local levels should:

- Fund up-front collaboration work, including building cross-level and cross-sector relationships
- Use the Request for Proposals process to evaluate the extent and quality of pre-existing working relationships in order to determine the viability of submitted proposals

Developing Effective Processes, Structures, and Governance Mechanisms

**Lesson Two:** Project sponsors and champions should recognize that total agreement on “the problem” is not necessary to move forward; however, a coalition is needed of members who are in enough agreement to proceed.

**Lesson Three:** Critical to the success of a collaboration is a project manager who can connect all the parts of the collaboration, is willing to pursue tasks in ways that are at odds with normal procedures and sequences, and is willing to assume a reasonable amount of calculated risk.

**Lesson Four:** Sponsors and champions should recognize that often inclusive processes and flat structures are initially necessary to reach agreements on how to proceed. Once agreements are reached, a more hierarchical structure involving limited participation processes may work better.

**Lesson Five:** Sponsors and champions should recognize the merits of relying on respected, neutral organizations and conveners to help stakeholders hammer out important project details during the planning phase.

**Lesson Six:** Regular meetings among major subgroups of key stakeholders are very useful. This includes the using pre-existing and new forums. Regular meetings in pre-existing and new forums are important components of building the cross-level, cross-sector, cross-boundary understandings and commitments.
Understanding the Roles of Key Actors

Lesson Seven: Sponsors and champions at all levels should pay careful attention to issue framing. The way in which an issue is framed determines the way in which key actors interpret their interests and assess the costs and benefits of various proposals. Issue framing also influences the construction of winning and losing arguments.

Lesson Eight: Sponsors and champions at all levels should seek the support of key political leaders so that elected-official support is available when needed.

Demonstrating Leadership and Key Competencies

Lesson Nine: Sponsors and champions at all levels should work to have in place the competencies needed to lead and follow through on a successful cross-level, cross-sector collaboration effort.

Specifically regarding the competencies of the sponsors and champions themselves:

- **Sponsors** have formal authority that they are able bring to bear in securing political support and other resources for the effort.

- **Champions**, who often lack formal authority, supply ideas, energy, and determination to help stakeholders define public problems, evaluate alternative solutions, and push for the most promising solutions. The most effective champions have considerable facilitation skills but also are able to articulate and frame the policy idea in comprehensible ways to multiple constituencies.

Lesson Ten: Organizational and collaborative ambidexterity is important to successful cross-sector collaborations. Ambidexterity means managing tensions, often separated by time or space. Typical tensions include:

- Stability versus change
- Hierarchy versus lateral relations
- The existing power structure versus voluntary and involuntary power sharing

Creating an Outcome-Oriented Accountability System

Lesson Eleven: Sponsors and champions should ensure creation of a system that tracks inputs, processes, and outcomes; and should use a variety of data gathering and interpretation, usage methods to track accountability and to evaluate the project's outcomes, including effects that may not be observable for some time.
## Appendix: Interviewee Characteristics

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<th>Interview Code</th>
<th>Sex</th>
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<th>Organization</th>
<th>Title/Rank</th>
<th>Policy Field</th>
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References


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